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Abstract
When humans interact with machines in their
daily networks, it is important that security of
the communications is offered, and where the
involved shared secrets used to achieve this are
easily remembered by humans. Password-based
authenticated group key exchange (PAGKE) schemes
allow group users to share a session key based
on a human-memorizable password. In this paper,
we consider two PAGKE schemes that build on
the seminal scheme of Burmester and Desmedt. We
show an undetectable online dictionary attack on the
first scheme, and exploit the partnering definition to
break the key indistinguishability of the second scheme.
Keywords: Password-authenticated key exchange,
group, model, proof, cryptanalysis.
1. Introduction
Password authenticated key exchange (PAKE)
schemes [5], [11], [12] allow two or more parties
to share a common secret key to secure subsequent
communications. PAKEs are popularly studied because
most systems depend on human interactions, as is
relevant to the context of present day ubiquitous en-
vironments; thus using a password is more practical
than a high-entropy secret key. If a human user is
assigned a high-entropy secret, he would try at first
instance to change it to an easily memorizable pass-
word, or be tempted to write it down somewhere or
have his web browser cache it. The first known PAKE
secure against dictionary attacks is the Encrypted Key
Exchange (EKE) by Bellovin and Merritt [5], for 2
parties. Subsequently, PAKEs for groups (3 parties or
more) have been proposed, e.g. [2], [9].
Research in group PAKEs can be seen to proceed
in two directions: one initiated by Abdalla et al. [2]
where each member shares a different password with
a server, so called the DPWA setting; while the other
initiated by Bresson et al. [9] where group members all
share the same password known as the SPWA setting.
Perhaps the most well known scalable group key
exchange is the one by Burmester and Desmedt
[11], in the SPWA setting. This is well suited for
dynamically changing groups since the number of
rounds of messages sent between group members is
constant, irrespective of the group size. Extensions to
this scheme appear in [17], [1]. The recent PAGKE
scheme by Kwon et al. at IWSEC 2006 [17] is an
adaptation of the Burmester-Desmedt to the SPWA
password setting, and is said to be the first provably
secure constant-round PAGKE in the standard model
(without requiring ideal random oracles). As far as we
know, only three constant-round SPWA-type PAGKE
schemes secure in the standard model exist, two of
which are analysed in this paper: the scheme by Kwon
et al. and the scheme by Abdalla and Pointcheval [3].
Our Results. We treat two PAGKE schemes in the
SPWA setting: the PAGKE scheme by Kwon et al.
[17] and the scheme by Abdalla and Pointcheval [3].
The benefit of schemes in this setting is that no trusted
server S is required.
First, we give an undetectable online dictionary
attack against PAGKE . Our attack exploits verifiable
messages that are similar to the offline dictionary
attacks by [1] against [14], [18]. We then show that
due a correctness problem, key indistinguishability of
the Abdalla-Pointcheval scheme comes under question.
To the best of our knowledge, our results are the
first known analysis of both these two schemes of
[17], [3]. In recent years, the issue of undetectable
online dictionary attacks has been raised [13], [21],
[22] because while it is accepted that online dictio-
nary attacks cannot be avoided for password-based
schemes, the typical mitigation which is outside the
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scope of protocol design, is to limit the number of
failed login attempts. However, this mitigation will
only work if failed login attempts can be detected in
the first place. But for undetectable online dictionary
attacks, incorrect password guesses and thus failed
login attempts go unnoticed by the legitimate protocol
participant being attacked by the adversary. Thus, the
adversary’s active attacks via Send queries (within the
context of the security model; see Section 2.1) cannot
be differentiated from honest executions of a legitimate
and honest protocol participant, so security against
undetectable online dictionary attacks cannot be bound
in the same way as detectable online dictionary attacks
in terms of Send queries.
We also show that an inconsistency between the
partnering definition in the security model and how
the group session key is generated, leads to a simple
but subtle attack on key indistinguishability that fails
to be captured by the scheme’s proofs. This is related
to showing that a scheme does not meet the correctness
requirement [3] of AKE schemes, defining that if two
instances of protocol participants are partnered and
accepted, then both should hold the same session key.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Model for Group Key Exchange
For completeness, we describe here the group key
exchange (GKE) security model [10], [7], [8].
PROTOCOL PARTICIPANTS AND EXECUTION. Let U
be a non-empty set of protocol players or parties. The
adversary, A, controls the communications between all
protocol players by interacting with the set of oracles,
ΠsUi , where Π
s
U is defined as the sth instantiation of a
player, Ui ∈ U , in a specific protocol run. A controls
the communication channels via queries to the targeted
oracles, as below.
• Send(ΠsUi ,m) query. This models A sending
messages to instances of players. A gets back
from his query the response which oracle ΠsUi
would have generated in processing message
m. If oracle ΠsUi has not yet terminated and
the execution of protocol leads to accepting,
variables SIDS are updated. A query of the
form Send(ΠsUi , “start”) initiates an execu-
tion of this protocol.
• Reveal(ΠsUi) query. Any oracle upon receiv-
ing such a query and if it has accepted and
so holds session key K, sends this to A.
• Corrupt(U) query. This query allows the ad-
versary to learn the long-lived key of user U .
Under the strong corruption model, internal
data of any instances of U executing the
protocol are also given to A. Under the weak
corruption model, only the long-lived key is
given to the adversary.
• Test(ΠsUi) query. This oracle query is only
available if ΠsUi is “fresh”. It allows to de-
fine the indistinguishability-based notion of
security for the key, defined by the follow-
ing game, denoted GameGKE(A,P ), between
adversary A and oracles ΠsUi involved in
executions of protocol P . During the game,
A can ask any of the above queries, and may
only ask the Test query once. Depending on
a randomly chosen bit, b ∈ {0, 1}, A is given
the actual session key if b = 1 or a session
key drawn randomly from the session key
distribution if b = 0. Finally, A outputs a
guess b′. Informally, A succeeds if it can
guess the bit b with non-negligible advantage
AdvGKEP,A over randomly guessing, where the
advantage is defined as
AdvGKEP,A = 2Pr[b′ = b]− 1.
Note that the first three queries: Send,Reveal,Corrupt
are common for any kind model for authenticated
key exchange protocols, to model the adversary’s
ability to attack the protocol. The final query Test is
used to define the security of the protocol for which
the adversary aims to break, in this case, that of the
indistinguishability of the session key.
3. The Constant-Round PAGKE Protocols
Let U1, . . . , Un be the identities in lexical order of
n users. Denote by G a finite cyclic group of order
q ∈ Z∗p, where p and q are two primes such that
p = 2q+1, and p a safe prime such that the Decisional
Diffie Hellman (DDH) is hard in G. g, g1 and g2
denote generators of G of order q such that the discrete
logarithmic relation between g1 and g2 is unknown. ||
denotes concatenation. All arithmetic operations in this
paper are performed under the group G.
3.1. PAGKE Schemes in SPWA Setting
The PAGKE scheme designed in the SPWA set-
ting by Kwon et al. [17] at IWSEC 2006 builds
on the Burmester-Desmedt scheme in [11]. Since
the Burmester-Desmedt scheme is designed without
authentication of messages, Kwon et al. suggest to
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authenticate broadcast messages from group mem-
bers by masking with a function of the group pass-
word. To be precise, this scheme which they called
as PAGKE , is described in Fig. 1. Meanwhile, an-
other PAGKE scheme designed in the SPWA setting
is by Abdalla and Pointcheval [3] at ASIACRYPT
2006, which builds on the Burmester-Desmedt [11],
Gennaro-Lindell [15] and Katz-Ostrovsky-Yung [16]
schemes. For compactness, this is specified in Fig. 2.
Some notations are required. (ski, vki) denotes
the signing and verification key pair of Ui,
with corresponding Sign(·) and V er(·) functions.
Enc(pk, l, pw; r) denotes tag-based (or labelled) en-
cryption under public key pk and public tag input l
and randomness r. UH represents a particular instance
of a family of universal hash functions, ProjKG(·)
denotes randomized key projection algorithm to gen-
erate projective hash keys, and ProjHash(·) denotes
the projected hashing algorithm. For exact details, the
readers are referred to [3]. For understanding this
paper, it is only required to note that testLi is not
included in T .
4. Attacks on SPWA-based PAGKE
Schemes
4.1. PAGKE Scheme
We show an undetectable online dictionary attack on
the Kwon et al. scheme PAGKE [17].
1) Make a guess pw′ of the group password pw. For
any x chosen by the adversary, compute X ′i−1 =
x · g
H(pw′||Ui−1)
2 and X ′i+1 = x · g
H(pw′||Ui+1)
2 .
2) Initiate a session and during Round 1 issue Send
queries to send X ′i−1 and X ′i+1 to Ui.
3) Thus Ui will compute
Yi = (
xi+1
xi−1
)ri
=


X′i+1
g
H(pw||Ui+1)
2
X′
i−1
g
H(pw||Ui−1)
2


ri
=


x·g
H(pw′||Ui+1)
2
g
H(pw||Ui+1)
2
x·g
H(pw′||Ui−1)
2
g
H(pw||Ui−1)
2


ri
=


g
H(pw′||Ui+1)
2
g
H(pw||Ui+1)
2
g
H(pw′||Ui−1)
2
g
H(pw||Ui−1)
2


ri
and broadcast Ui||2||Yi.
4) Check if Yi = 1. Otherwise, repeat from step
(1.) by making another guess of pw′.
Note that Ui will not notice that anything is wrong
or that an incorrect password was used because the
scheme does not explicitly check that passwords used
by other group members are correct.
In fact, the adversary can do better by mounting
this attack in parallel, i.e. simultaneously making n
different password guesses, and launching the attack
against all Ui for i = 1 . . . n. Thus, each session allows
to verify n password guesses instead of just 1.
4.2. Abdalla-Pointcheval Scheme
Abdalla and Pointcheval presented [3] a constant-
round PAGKE scheme based on the group key ex-
change scheme of Burmester-Desmedt [11] and the
2-party PAKE schemes of Gennaro-Lindell [15] and
Katz-Ostrovsky-Yung [16]. The scheme works in
broadcast mode, where messages sent from a group
member is received by all other members.
Our main observation is the definition of session
identifier sid used subsequently in the definition of
partnering within the security model defined by Ab-
dalla and Pointcheval in [3]. For completeness, we
restate the definitions here.
Partnering [3]. Let the session identifier sidi of
a participant instance U i be a function of all the
messages sent and received by U i as specified by
the group key exchange protocol. Let the partner
identifier pidi of a participant instance U i be a set
of all participants with whom U i wishes to establish
a common secret key. Two instances U i1 and U i
′
2 are
said to be partnered if and only if pidi1=pidi
′
2 and
sidi1=sidi
′
2 .
This is a standard definition of sid and partnering.
In fact, the use of sidi in their scheme specification in
Fig. 1 of [3] differs from the standard sidi definition
given in their model, i.e. here the sidi is given as a
function of only some but not all messages sent and
received by each group member. Thus, there are in fact
two versions of sidi definitions in [3].
We give a simple attack similar to the attack in
Section 3.2 that works on the Abdalla-Pointcheval
scheme when partnering is defined as above in their
security model.
1) Adversary A launches an Execute query for
a protocol session involving group members
U1, . . . , Un. This models the adversary eaves-
dropping on messages exchanged among mem-
bers during this session.
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Round 1:
Each group member Ui chooses a random number ri ∈$ Z∗q , computes xi =
gri1 and Xi = xi · g
H(pw||Ui)
2 . Each Ui broadcasts Ui||1||Xi, where 1
represents the broadcast message in the first round.
Round 2:
Each Ui computes xi−1 and xi+1 using pw and the sender’s identities
Ui−1 and Ui+1, respectively. Then Ui computes Yi = (xi+1/xi−1)ri and
broadcasts Ui||2||Yi.
Key computation:
Each Ui computes the secret key for F as ki = (xnrii−1) · Y
n−1
i · Y
n−2
i+1 ·
. . . Yi−2 = g
r1r2+r2r3+···+rnr1
1 , and the session key ski = Fki(U||sid
′),
where U = (U1, . . . , Un), sid′ = 1||X||2||Y, X = (X1, . . . ,Xn), and Y =
(Y1, . . . , Yn).
Figure 1. PAGKE scheme of IWSEC 2006 [17]
2) A then initiates a new protocol session involving
the same group members, this time issuing a
Send query in Round 4 to replace broadcast
message (Xi, testLi ) from Ui to Uj (j ∈ {i +
1, i − 1}) with (Xi, test′Li ) where test
′L
i is the
Round 4 message of the previous session. The
rest of the protocol steps proceed normally.
3) A issues a Reveal query to Uj and obtains the
session key sk.
4) A issues a Test query to Ui and obtains the test
session key sk∗.
5) A checks if sk∗ = sk and outputs b = 1 if it is.
Otherwise it outputs b = 0.
Note that based on the standard definition of sid in
the Abdalla-Pointcheval model [3] restated above, Ui
and Uj will have different sids thus they will not be
partnered. Thus, issuing a Reveal query to Uj does not
violate the freshness of the instance of Ui, but in fact
Ui and Uj will compute the same session key because
the only difference between this session and an honest
execution is that testL1 to Uj is replaced, but testLi is
not used by Uj in verifications nor computations that
affect the established session key since it only uses
messages from its left and right neighbours; thus it
will equal the session key computed by other group
members. Thus, changing testLi for Uj necessarily
translates to Uj not being partnered with other group
members although Uj computes the same session key
as others. Again, this is an issue related to correctness
of the scheme.
In fact, if the definition of sid is not a function of
all messages but of messages excluding testLi , then
our attack above no longer works. However, this would
be a non-standard definition that differs from existing
literature [4], [10].
Interestingly, the earlier scheme by the same authors
Abdalla et al. [1] for which security can only be
proven in the random oracle and ideal cipher models,
resists this attack because there is correctness issue.
To be precise, session key computation is a function
of all broadcast messages, thus ensuring that partnered
instances will compute the same key, and vice versa.
5. Conclusion
Our results cover two of three known PAGKE
schemes provably secure in the standard model. The
third scheme, by Bohli et al. [6], appears to resist
attacks that we have presented. It is also known [3]
that the Bohli et al. scheme is more efficient that the
Abdalla-Pointcheval scheme. Thus current results gives
more preference towards the Bohli et al. scheme than
the other two schemes in [17], [3].
The approach we take is one of analyzing security
protocols often with accompanying provable security
proofs. Such protocols attract analysis attention since
they were by right rigorously designed and analyzed
within formally defined security models; thus any
claim-invalidating attacks potentially reveal insights
into subtleties missed by existing proofs or proof
techniques. See [20], [23], [24] for other related work
in this direction.
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Group member Ui
pidi = {U1, . . . , Un}
(ski, vki)
$
← SKG(1k)
li = vki||U1|| . . . ||Un
cRi = Enc(pk, li, pw; r
R
i )
Broadcast: li,c
R
i−→
hkLi
$
← HK(pk)
phkLi
$
← ProjKG(hkLi , li−1, c
R
i−1)
cLi = Enc(pk, li, pw; r
L
i )
Broadcast: phk
L
i ,c
L
i−→
hki, hk
R
i
$
← HK(pk)
phki
$
← ProjKG(hki, li+1, c
L
i+1)
phkRi
$
← ProjKG(hkRi , li+1, c
L
i+1)
KLi+1 = ProjHash(phk
L
i+1, c
R
i , li, pw, r
R
i )
KRi = Hash(hk
R
i , c
L
i+1, li+1, pw)
XRi = K
L
i+1 ·K
R
i
testRi = UH1(X
R
i )
σRi = Sign(ski, T
R
i )
Broadcast: phki,phk
R
i ,test
R
i ,σ
R
i−→
if V er(vki−1, TRi−1, σRi−1) = 0 then acci =false
KLi = Hash(hk
L
i , c
R
i−1, li−1, pw)
KRi−1 = ProjHash(phk
R
i−1, c
L
i , li, pw, r
L
i )
XLi = K
L
i ·K
R
i−1
if testRi−1 6= UH1(XLi ) then acci =false
testLi = UH2(X
L
i )
Ki = Hash(hki, c
L
i+1, li+1, pw)
KRi−1 = ProjHash(phki−1, c
L
i , li, pw, r
L
i )
Xi = Ki/Ki−1
Broadcast: Xi,test
L
i−→
if testLi+1 6= UH2(XRi ) then acci =false
if Πnl=1Xl 6= 1 then acci =false
T = T1|| . . . ||Tn
σi = Sign(ski, T )
Broadcast: σi−→
for j = 1, . . . , i− 1, i+ 1, . . . , n
if V er(vkj , T, σj) = 0 then acci =false
end for
MSK = Kni ·Π
n−1
j=1X
n−j
i+j
SK = UH ′(MSK)
acci =true
sidi = T
Figure 2. Abdalla-Pointcheval scheme of ASIACRYPT 2006 [17], where TRi =
Ui||Ui+1||c
R
i ||c
L
i+1||phki||phk
R
i ||phl
L
i+1||test
R
i and Ti = vki||Ui||ci||phki||phkLi ||phkRi ||Xi||XLi for i = 1 . . . n.
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